Category Archives: General Philosophy

Making Sense

12 Monday Feb 2018

Posted by in General Philosophy, Inquiry, Logic, Metaphysics, Philosophy of Science, Process Philosophy, Whitehead

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Whitehead set out to make sense of things. After witnessing all of his attempts to point out how Einstein’s general theory of relativity failed to make the sense it claimed to make (and still fails to do so, but the model centrists won’t permit empirical evidence to get in the way of their clever mathematics), he arguably decided that he needed to step back from epistemology and philosophy of science, to present a more logically primary argument, in the metaphysical form of his “philosophy of organism.” Whitehead centered his argument on what I and Randy Auxier named “the quantum of explanation,” a logical (rather than ontological) center, around which Whitehead constructed his subtle and complex system of making sense. It has been suggested that Whitehead’s magnum opus, Process and Reality, is one of the five most difficulty works in the Western philosophical canon. I’m not inclined to argue with such a sentiment, since the most that could be credibly argued is that it might be knocked back to sixth place. For my part, I’m not sure what work could manage that feat.No Sense

One of the points that Randy and I tried to emphasize was that the process of “making sense” was itself a rather complex process, in which the most active word in the proceeding is process: this is not an object you hold, but an activity you engage in. So despite my habitual focus upon contemporary science &/or concerns, this is actually as classic an issue as you can find in the Western philosophical canon. (And I just don’t have the expertise to speak with even casual ignorance about the Eastern canon, a source of inestimable insight and subtlety. I am, however, inclined – ignorant as I am – to suspect that what I have to say here can find its analogs in that tradition.) Continue reading →

Nature versus Naturalism

29 Monday Jan 2018

Posted by in General Philosophy, Logic, Metaphysics, naturalism, Philosophy of Science, Process Philosophy, Whitehead

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Nature is that which is studied by physical science. Saying as much does not answer many questions; most particularly, it tells us neither what nature nor science happen to be, only that they are connected as inquiry and thing inquired into. That being said, one can also notice that it is necessary to have some notion or concept of what it is that one is inquiring into, in order for that inquiry to have any sort of systematic or methodologically sound structure. Absent such a concept, inquiry loses any possibility of systematicity, and instead becomes nothing more than random shifting around and arbitrary clutching at straws. Such shifting and clutching will, ideally, eventuate in a more systematic concept of the topic being inquired into, at which point inquiry “moves into a new gear,” and begins to become genuinely organized. Physical science has long since moved past such a phase of randomly poking things with a stick; it has long been operating with a detailed and thoroughly developed concept of nature. But while the sciences have A concept of nature, does that mean they have the best concept of nature? There are reasons to believe that the answer to this question is “no.”Nature

This brings us to the philosophical question of naturalism. Some forms of naturalism take the position that “nature is all there is,” which might seem like a fairly strong metaphysical commitment until one realizes that saying, “nature is all there is,” tells us nothing about what all nature is. So in order to have any cognitive content, any and all forms of naturalism – regardless of whether or not they admit the possibility of anything beyond nature – must, primarily, be a thesis about what nature is. So a form of naturalism will be the source of a concomitant concept of nature. I will state without argument that the two stand in a one-to-one relationship: if “a” form of naturalism resulted in a “family” of concepts of nature, then in reality what we would have is a family of forms of naturalism as well – one member of this latter family for each concept in the former. Continue reading →

Intuition in Mathematics and Physics: A Whiteheadian Approach

05 Friday Aug 2016

Posted by in 2015 International Whitehead Conference, General Philosophy, Inquiry, Logic, Mathematics, naturalism, Philosophy of Science, Public Philosophy, Whitehead

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This is just a quick shout-out to my friend and colleague, Ronny Desmet, for putting together the papers that were presented at the 2015 International Whitehead conference in the new book, Intuition in Mathematics and Physics: A Whiteheadian Approach, in which yours truly is a contributor. Intuition Mathematics

The articles within are from Section IV, Track 2 of the conference. The table of contents is not yet available at Amazon, so the contributions are as follows:

  1. Integral Philosophy – An Essay on Speculative Philosophy – Ronald Preston Phipps
  2. Reflection on Intuition, Physics, and Speculative Philosophy – Timothy E. Eastman
  3. Whitehead on Intuition – Implications for Science and Civilization – Farzad Mahootian
  4. Whitehead’s Notion of Intuitive Recognition – Ronny Desmet
  5. The Beauty of the Two-Color Sphere Problem – Ronny Desmet
  6. The Complementary Faces of Mathematical Beauty – Jean Paul van Bendegam and Ronny Desmet
  7. Creating a New Mathematics – Aran Gare
  8. Whitehead, Intuition, and Radical Empiricism – Gary Herstein
  9. What Does a Particle Know? Information and Entaglement – Robert J. Valenza
  10. A Neurobiological Basis of Intuition – Jesse Bettinger

Models and Interpretations

18 Saturday Jun 2016

Posted by in Critical Thinking, General Philosophy, Logic, Religion

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A number of years ago I got into a discussion with an acquaintance about what kind of symbol system tells us “the truth” about the world. This is not how my interlocutor expressed the problem; she simply insisted that mathematics gives us the truth. I tried many different approaches to get her to understand that what she was saying made absolutely no sense, because the first thing that must happen (once any collection of symbols is at hand) in order to talk about truth was that those symbols have to be interpreted, and such interpretation is not given in advance. Thus, I have a modest background in some advanced forms of mathematics (mainly formal logic, abstract algebra, and a touch of differential geometry), and I understand that simply having a bunch of squiggles in front of you is not enough to adjudicate whether those squiggles say anything at all, much less anything that is true. Meanings must be assigned to those squiggles such that they hang together to form some kind of model, and that model then must be associated with the world in some form such that the model can be interpreted as making claims about the world which then can be interpreted as to its truth content. And here, “world” can mean either the world of concrete experience or a purely abstract “world” which is itself something of a mathematical construct. Also, my choice of the term “truth content” rather than “truth value” is not an innocent one: I wish to leave open the possibility that truth evaluations can be more complex and multi-dimensional than the mere assignment of values.Three Mesas

It became very clear that while I understood my acquaintance’s position, she in no way understood mine. This was because while I was repeatedly able to paraphrase – that is, interpret – her argument, when asked to do the same for mine she was unable to do anything other than repeat her own position, which addressed none of the points I had made. In later years, she was known to crow a bit about how she “won” the argument. To be fair, in retrospect I realize that there were a number of ways I could have made my own position clearer, as it was burdened by a much greater degree of philosophical nuance than the position she was presenting. And I confess that I do not think quickly on my feet; indeed, I’ve only ever suggested that, given time, I can think thoroughly. (One of the reasons I went into philosophy is because a line like, “Herstein! If we don’t get this metaphysical principle out the door by end of business today, our competition is going to crucify us!” is not something one is ever likely to hear from one’s department head.) Continue reading →

Sending the “Wrong Message”

29 Tuesday Mar 2016

Posted by in Critical Thinking, General Philosophy, Humor, Logic

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One of the most singularly asinine claims that might be floated in any discussion is the one that follows the pattern that, “doing X will send the wrong message.” Characterizing such infantile twaddle as “asinine” is almost certainly an offense to all those statements in the world that are genuinely (but only) asinine. What makes such statements so unqualifiedly despicable is that they are all built around the fatuous presupposition that any act or statement is so unambiguously closed in its meaning that it can only send one, equally closed and unambiguous, message. Such childishness is of a piece with those who claim to take the Bible (or any other text) “literally,” as though the “literal” interpretation of any text were even possible in the abstract, much less actualizable in the concrete. I’ll have a few words to say on this latter topic at the end.404-error-page-not-found

What brought this to mind was a brief news story on the radio this AM, that mentioned how the Illinois legislative branch was considering a measure to decriminalize (note: NOT legalize, because that would generate huge amounts of revenue for the state, and we can’t allow that to happen … ) possession of small amounts of marijuana (I forget how much exactly). In addition, the bill would specify how much THC one could have in one’s system to be considered legally impaired for driving. Several law enforcement and “concerned citizens” groups oppose such actions on the grounds that it would “send the wrong message” to our delicate and oh-so-easily influenced youth. Well, as soon as the “wrong message” meme surfaces, you know the persons throwing this claim about are either stupid, lying, or both. So let us look at stupid first, lying second, and finish (as promised) with “textual literalism.” Continue reading →

Cat People

08 Tuesday Mar 2016

Posted by in cats, General Philosophy, Humor

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There are three types of cat people, but I’ll get back to that in a moment …

Instead, I want to center the theme of this post around the idea of philosophers and cats. Philosophers, mind you, not so much philosophy. I talk about the latter quite a bit as it is, and a considerable amount of philosophy will be evident (if only implicit) in what I really want to talk about: philosophers and cats. A number of scientifically vacuous and philosophically dubious surveys are reported in the anecdotal penumbra engulfing what passes for scholarly philosophy which suggests that philosophers overwhelmingly prefer cats to dogs. Certainly this is true for me, and for those scholars I am acquainted with. (See above, under “anecdotal penumbra.”) Mind, I do not dislike dogs in the least, and am profoundly upset when I encounter a dog that does not instantly like me. (It happens occasionally, usually with rescue dogs that have been subjected to abuse of some severe, and invariably undeserved, quality.) But I have never owned a dog, and would never adopt one except under the most extreme circumstances.Cat People

For one thing, dogs are so needy. And not in the good way, where they walk up and demand your immediate and unqualified attention. No they’ve got to get all passive-aggressive, sad and doe-eyed, “pwease wuv me,” about things, and guilt you into being the pack leader. (Everyone knows that dogs are pack animals, including and especially the dogs themselves. Hence their mastery of political manipulation from the Beta position.) Cats are not like that. Cat comes up and says, “You may adore me now,” or, often enough, “You may adore me NOW! (Damnit!)” Just as often, the cat will make it clear that it will cost you blood to interrupt its current mood or project. So why would philosophers (as a statistical aggregate, mind you, not a univocally defined class) not only tolerate, but seek out such assholery? Continue reading →

Philosophical Explanation

04 Wednesday Nov 2015

Posted by in Critical Thinking, General Philosophy, Logic

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It strikes me that I’ve said very little about the nature of philosophical explanation, even as I write from a specifically philosophical perspective and intent. This might qualify as ironic, but I’m never confident that I’m using the word “irony” (or its variants) properly. Which, for a man with my education, might also be ironic …Because Philosophy

I’ve written a number of posts variously exploring the nature, the expectations, and a few of the pitfalls surrounding scientific explanations. I’ve probed a few ethical/moral issues, and even discussed some fairly generic questions around the large scale issue of the “logic of inquiry” itself. But beyond a few scattered comments, I’ve not really posed the question (along with a tentative answer) about the nature and value of specifically philosophical inquiry itself. This post will be my first concerted stab in that direction. Continue reading →

“Specialization Is For Insects”

20 Sunday Sep 2015

Posted by in Academia, General Philosophy

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James Ladyman recently published an essay in The Philosophers’ Magazine arguing (as the title of the essay would indicate) in praise of specialization within the discipline of philosophy. (Attentive purists will notice that I use American spellings, and not the British forms used in Ladyman’s article.) Colleague (and occasional commentor) Brian Burtt brought Ladyman’s essay to my attention, with a gentle prod for my thoughts on Ladyman’s argument. As a general rule, I’m quite happy to do “requests,” and so what follows are my not-quite initial reactions to the article. (Not quite initial, as they are colored by a degree of considered thought.)Praying Mantis One can safely hazard a guess as to the top layer of my remarks, from the Heinlein quote that titles this blog post. However, there are a few subtleties I hope to add, beyond just and only the Notebooks of Lararus Long. Continue reading →

Anti-Intellectualism and Racism?

20 Saturday Jun 2015

Posted by in Altemeyer, Authoritarians, General Philosophy, Logic, Racism

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A post over at Psychology Today makes the claim that “Anti-intellectualism Is Killing America.” Citing the horrific mass murder in Charleston by the overtly racist Dylann Roof, the essay goes on to state that, “Many will correctly blame Roof’s actions on America’s culture of racism and gun violence, but it’s time to realize that such phenomena are directly tied to the nation’s culture of ignorance.”

Now, among the more singularly despicable statements made by conservative politicians, pundits, and supposed “news” outlets, have been the cowardly red herring evasions of the obvious and irrefutable fact of Roof’s overtly and explicitly stated racist motivations in the mass murder at the Emanuel African Methodist Episcopal Church. The disgusting refusal on the parts of so many to frankly acknowledge and deplore the blatant racism behind Roof’s act of terrorism is beyond inexcusable. The people engaged in such denial and misdirection are themselves complicit in Roof’s crimes as enablers and legitimizers.mckinney-texas-pool-party_400x295_82

But even though anti-intellectualism and racism may likely be frequent, even inevitable, co-travelers, can we justifiably assert that anti-intellectualism is the root, and racism is the branch, as the author in the above Psychology Today post does? I do not think so. Continue reading →

Science and Philosophy

11 Thursday Jun 2015

Posted by in General Philosophy, Logic, Philosophy of Science, Whitehead

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My colleague Brian asked (some little while ago), “I wondered if you might make some comments on the relationship (assuming there is one) between science and speculative philosophy?” Well, now that the generalized madness that is and was the 2015 International Whitehead Conference is behind me, I finally have time to turn my attention to this and other questions.

There is absolutely a relationship between science and speculative philosophy, and it is worth remembering how that relationship expressed itself in the past: Copernicus, Galileo, and Newton all knew themselves to be engaged IN philosophy when they made their grand, speculative proposals. My answer here, however, will be thoroughly Whiteheadian. Not, however, because I’m a “fan,” but because I believe that Whitehead was substantially correct on the issues he chose to engage, and always interesting, regardless.* Continue reading →