Tag Archives: General Philosophy

Viral Philosophy

21 Saturday Aug 2021

Posted by in General Philosophy, Media, Professoriate, Public Philosophy, Social Media

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A couple of different articles recently have spoken to the need for the humanities in general, and philosophy in particular, to become a more active voice in contemporary matters, particularly with regard to the COVID-19 pandemic. One article (which I’ll get to below the fold) was especially critical of the “failure of philosophy,” singling out as the basis of this sweeping claim a famous European scholar’s decision to become publicly and egregiously stupid. A second article (which I’ll get to after the first) is not focused on philosophy so much as the humanities in general, and even here the author (a former Chancellor of UC Berkeley) is more concerned on the social sciences than upon the humanities as such. This second piece brings us back to C. P. Snow’s famous lament about the “two cultures”, and argues that the problems Snow argued about have only gotten worse, even as “the players” have in many respects reversed positions.i

A cute picture of my cat so that this post will go viral and reach tens of people …

My concern here will be with philosophy rather than the humanities writ large, and specifically the impact that philosophy and philosophers can and ought to have upon the world. This latter topic falls under the general heading of what is called “public philosophy.” This is an instance of “what is old is new again;” in terms of the contemporary academy, public philosophy is a fairly new idea (one which many academic philosophers openly object to.) In terms of the history of philosophy, it is as old as the topic itself. I’ll not engage the debate about whether or not one should engage in public philosophy here, since its need is so manifestly obvious such “debate” is as silly as arguing over whether or not we should breathe. Rather, I wish to talk about the ways (and possibly the “ifs”) of how public philosophy has failed us in these last 18 months of global pandemic.

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The Sisyphean Dot

15 Monday Apr 2019

Posted by in cats, General Philosophy, Humor

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The myth of Sisyphus and, in particular, Camus’ reading of that story, are obviously on my mind. Having mentioned the story in my last post, I want to say more about it here, only in the context of process metaphysics.

And cats.

Red Dit

Cats, you see, are either the worst or the best existentialist philosophers. The difficulty in answering this question is not because they are cats, but because of all the labored verbiage that goes into saying what existentialism is. Indeed, where I want to take this argument is in the direction of undermining that last phrase. Existentialists say that the world is absurd, but much of that claim turns on the use of that annoying little verb “is”. Sartre, for example, named his magnum opus Being and Nothingness, with the first half of that title emphasizing the root verb (“to be”) from which all forms of “is” emerge. If the focus of existentialist thought is directed upon “being” and forms of “is-ness,” then much of existentialism’s claims of absurdity stand or fall upon the priority given over to the word “is.” If so, then even asking the question, “what existentialism is” could well be a fundamental error that many existentialists themselves commit. So the direction of our discussion here is this: to gloss Camus’ famous essay “The Myth of Sisyphus,” illustrate some salient points using cats, and segue finally into how the whole thing gets reimagined in a process metaphysics. Continue reading →

Meaningful Life

11 Tuesday Dec 2018

Posted by in General Philosophy, Metaphysics, Process Philosophy, Relationalism

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It is easy to find meaning in life in general; any herd of halfwits with a few books of philosophy under their respective or collective belts can do as much. But is MY life in particular meaningful? That is a very different question. The short answer – which, as always, will require a lengthy explanation – is, “maybe not.” But that “maybe not” itself comes with an important qualifier: almost certainly not in the form you were expecting. Right there is the primer that starts the engine of existentialism sputtering in poorly tuned outrage; that, and my grossly mixed metaphors. Not to take too much credit, but the latter might be the more important factor …Dusk

Nevertheless, there are two terms in the foregoing that merit some initial attention because of the oft unattended distinctions they bring into play: the “general” and the “particular”. In the spectrum of reasons, these two modalities of qualification are fairly far apart. Yet a great deal of discussion around the vitally important topic of the meaning of life flounders precisely on problem of navigating between these two rocks – this Scylla and Charybdis, to abuse my metaphors even further – that aren’t even all that close together. Navigating between them ought to be as straight forward as understanding if one is in the Atlantic or the Pacific oceans. Yet I don’t recall ever seeing matters satisfactorily distinguished, which is (like as not) as much a sad commentary on my scholarship as anything. So prior to getting to matters of any real substance, I must spend a few words on the interface between logic and metaphysics, so as to highlight the overlap between metaphysics and facts. Continue reading →

Models and Interpretations

18 Saturday Jun 2016

Posted by in Critical Thinking, General Philosophy, Logic, Religion

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A number of years ago I got into a discussion with an acquaintance about what kind of symbol system tells us “the truth” about the world. This is not how my interlocutor expressed the problem; she simply insisted that mathematics gives us the truth. I tried many different approaches to get her to understand that what she was saying made absolutely no sense, because the first thing that must happen (once any collection of symbols is at hand) in order to talk about truth was that those symbols have to be interpreted, and such interpretation is not given in advance. Thus, I have a modest background in some advanced forms of mathematics (mainly formal logic, abstract algebra, and a touch of differential geometry), and I understand that simply having a bunch of squiggles in front of you is not enough to adjudicate whether those squiggles say anything at all, much less anything that is true. Meanings must be assigned to those squiggles such that they hang together to form some kind of model, and that model then must be associated with the world in some form such that the model can be interpreted as making claims about the world which then can be interpreted as to its truth content. And here, “world” can mean either the world of concrete experience or a purely abstract “world” which is itself something of a mathematical construct. Also, my choice of the term “truth content” rather than “truth value” is not an innocent one: I wish to leave open the possibility that truth evaluations can be more complex and multi-dimensional than the mere assignment of values.Three Mesas

It became very clear that while I understood my acquaintance’s position, she in no way understood mine. This was because while I was repeatedly able to paraphrase – that is, interpret – her argument, when asked to do the same for mine she was unable to do anything other than repeat her own position, which addressed none of the points I had made. In later years, she was known to crow a bit about how she “won” the argument. To be fair, in retrospect I realize that there were a number of ways I could have made my own position clearer, as it was burdened by a much greater degree of philosophical nuance than the position she was presenting. And I confess that I do not think quickly on my feet; indeed, I’ve only ever suggested that, given time, I can think thoroughly. (One of the reasons I went into philosophy is because a line like, “Herstein! If we don’t get this metaphysical principle out the door by end of business today, our competition is going to crucify us!” is not something one is ever likely to hear from one’s department head.) Continue reading →

Sending the “Wrong Message”

29 Tuesday Mar 2016

Posted by in Critical Thinking, General Philosophy, Humor, Logic

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One of the most singularly asinine claims that might be floated in any discussion is the one that follows the pattern that, “doing X will send the wrong message.” Characterizing such infantile twaddle as “asinine” is almost certainly an offense to all those statements in the world that are genuinely (but only) asinine. What makes such statements so unqualifiedly despicable is that they are all built around the fatuous presupposition that any act or statement is so unambiguously closed in its meaning that it can only send one, equally closed and unambiguous, message. Such childishness is of a piece with those who claim to take the Bible (or any other text) “literally,” as though the “literal” interpretation of any text were even possible in the abstract, much less actualizable in the concrete. I’ll have a few words to say on this latter topic at the end.404-error-page-not-found

What brought this to mind was a brief news story on the radio this AM, that mentioned how the Illinois legislative branch was considering a measure to decriminalize (note: NOT legalize, because that would generate huge amounts of revenue for the state, and we can’t allow that to happen … ) possession of small amounts of marijuana (I forget how much exactly). In addition, the bill would specify how much THC one could have in one’s system to be considered legally impaired for driving. Several law enforcement and “concerned citizens” groups oppose such actions on the grounds that it would “send the wrong message” to our delicate and oh-so-easily influenced youth. Well, as soon as the “wrong message” meme surfaces, you know the persons throwing this claim about are either stupid, lying, or both. So let us look at stupid first, lying second, and finish (as promised) with “textual literalism.” Continue reading →

Cat People

08 Tuesday Mar 2016

Posted by in cats, General Philosophy, Humor

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There are three types of cat people, but I’ll get back to that in a moment …

Instead, I want to center the theme of this post around the idea of philosophers and cats. Philosophers, mind you, not so much philosophy. I talk about the latter quite a bit as it is, and a considerable amount of philosophy will be evident (if only implicit) in what I really want to talk about: philosophers and cats. A number of scientifically vacuous and philosophically dubious surveys are reported in the anecdotal penumbra engulfing what passes for scholarly philosophy which suggests that philosophers overwhelmingly prefer cats to dogs. Certainly this is true for me, and for those scholars I am acquainted with. (See above, under “anecdotal penumbra.”) Mind, I do not dislike dogs in the least, and am profoundly upset when I encounter a dog that does not instantly like me. (It happens occasionally, usually with rescue dogs that have been subjected to abuse of some severe, and invariably undeserved, quality.) But I have never owned a dog, and would never adopt one except under the most extreme circumstances.Cat People

For one thing, dogs are so needy. And not in the good way, where they walk up and demand your immediate and unqualified attention. No they’ve got to get all passive-aggressive, sad and doe-eyed, “pwease wuv me,” about things, and guilt you into being the pack leader. (Everyone knows that dogs are pack animals, including and especially the dogs themselves. Hence their mastery of political manipulation from the Beta position.) Cats are not like that. Cat comes up and says, “You may adore me now,” or, often enough, “You may adore me NOW! (Damnit!)” Just as often, the cat will make it clear that it will cost you blood to interrupt its current mood or project. So why would philosophers (as a statistical aggregate, mind you, not a univocally defined class) not only tolerate, but seek out such assholery? Continue reading →

Philosophical Explanation

04 Wednesday Nov 2015

Posted by in Critical Thinking, General Philosophy, Logic

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It strikes me that I’ve said very little about the nature of philosophical explanation, even as I write from a specifically philosophical perspective and intent. This might qualify as ironic, but I’m never confident that I’m using the word “irony” (or its variants) properly. Which, for a man with my education, might also be ironic …Because Philosophy

I’ve written a number of posts variously exploring the nature, the expectations, and a few of the pitfalls surrounding scientific explanations. I’ve probed a few ethical/moral issues, and even discussed some fairly generic questions around the large scale issue of the “logic of inquiry” itself. But beyond a few scattered comments, I’ve not really posed the question (along with a tentative answer) about the nature and value of specifically philosophical inquiry itself. This post will be my first concerted stab in that direction. Continue reading →

Opinion Entitlement

05 Sunday Oct 2014

Posted by in Critical Thinking, General Philosophy

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Phrases and declarations such as, “I have a right to my opinion!” or “I’m entitled to my opinion!” are deeply problematic. This is because the valorization of, and defensiveness toward, opinion – mere opinion – has become so over-inflated that it seems at times to border upon the pathological. We are expected to guard and cherish peoples’ opinions as though these were the most precious of things, when in reality opinion by itself is the most tedious, commonplace, and uninteresting stuff imaginable. Now, a bit of care needs to be exercised here, as I am using the term “opinion” in a somewhat specific sense. But the specificity of my use here is not a violation of the core meaning of the term. Meanwhile, as thinking beings – even if we only think poorly &/or occasionally – we should be aiming higher than just and only opinion.tantrum

To name just a few of the inter-related problems with opinion, as already noted above, (1) opinions are cheap throw away items of no particular interest in themselves. (2) Indeed, as thinking persons we ought to care very little about opinions, qua opinions. This “ought” is both logical and moral in its import. (3) This general disregard in no way threatens or impinges upon anyone else’s “right” to their own opinion. But rights come with responsibilities, and in this case it is the responsibility to move beyond mere opinion into the realm of reasoned argument and cogent understanding of the world. It often seems to pass that those who most ardently defend their supposedly threatened right to their opinion are more often objecting because they implicitly do not wish to take responsibility for that opinion. Let’s look at these points in turn. Continue reading →

Let’s Get … Philosophical!

30 Tuesday Sep 2014

Posted by in Critical Thinking, Education, General Philosophy, Politics

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(“I want to hear your bodying forth talk?” If you understood that joke you are both old and over-educated.)

So, I see another popular article suggesting that an education in philosophy is not the worst thing a person might do to themselves. I actually agree with the argument, but as presented by US NEWS in the above link, a few notes ought to be added from some one who went all the way down the rabbit hole.

Continue reading →