Ethics, Pedagogy, and Process

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This entry is a follow-up to The Road To Hell, insofar as it concludes with an outline of Edgar Sheffield Brightman‘s Moral Laws. gavel1-md Brightman, as I noted in that earlier post, is the man that the Reverend Doctor Martin Luther King went to Boston University to study under for his (King’s) Ph.D. On this account alone, Brightman is one of the most singularly influential figures in American thought. So it is more than a little disturbing that he is not given a single mention (to say nothing of an article) in either of the main online encyclopedia’s of philosophy. But leaving that travesty aside, I thought it might be useful to embed the outline of Brightman’s argument in a larger discussion about the nature of philosophical ethics. Specifically, how ought one teach it (note that that “ought” is itself an ethical imperative), and what ought one to teach? As usually happens, these questions are not unrelated.

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The Road To Hell

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In case you don’t know, the above mentioned stretch of pavement is not laid down with brick or asphalt. Rather, it is paved with “good intentions.” I “intend” to have a few words on the subject; I hope they are “good.” If our intentions are good, and we are lucky, we hope things will turn out well. After all, our intentions were in the “right” place, so what more could one ask (much less require)? But this rhetorical question brings us to the very heart of the problem: “luck” is not a method, and “hope” is not a plan. Road To HellBy justifying ourselves on nothing more than our intentions (and our hopes for luck, as far as they go), it is arguably the case that what we really “hope” to do (if we are lucky) is completely separate ourselves from any responsibility for the consequences of our actions. However, let us not assume that things are quite so simple in either direction. Permit me to savagely gloss a few classical ideas from moral philosophy. Continue reading

Open Mindedness

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What does it mean to be “open” minded? Open mindedness is supposed to be found at some far end of (some) spectrum (or other) from “closed” mindedness. But what “spectrum,” and what “end”?

There is a saying – variously and unreliably attributed to everyone and no one in particular – that many people would profit from taking to heart: “One ought to have an open mind, but not so open that one’s brains fall out.”

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Closed Mindedness

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Claims about “closed” and “open” mindedness get tossed about with considerable enthusiasm, with the former being BAD and the latter being GOOD. Many of those tossing the terms about are persons who either object to, or have little or not capacity for, basic logical rigor or critical thinking. There are concepts involved that do merit rather more praise or blame than purely neutral indifference, but matters are a little more subtle than folks sometimes allow. This seems like a good time to touch on these subjects.

Closed mindedness, in its severest form, is straight-out dogmatism. Dogmatism is one of the seven categories Robert Altemeyer uses in characterizing authoritarian style thought processes in his book. Given that I’ve touched on some of Altemeyers ideas in these previous posts, it might seem more natural to include a discussion of dogmatism with that collection. However, for my discussion here it is more appropriate to pair the concepts of open and closed mindedness with one another (which Altemeyer does not particularly do), and the specific concept of closed mindedness I’ll be looking at here is rather more than just the extreme case of dogmatism. But dogmatism is certainly a case – an extreme one – of closed mindedness, and by the nature of its extremity it draws the lines of our topic in particularly sharp relief. So let us begin there.

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Foolish Consistency?

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So I’ve previously floated some remarks about Emerson’s famous quote about a foolish consistency being the hobgoblin of a narrow mind. It seems reasonable that there might be something like a foolish consistency, but is that evident reasonableness actually validated in practice? And how might a person with a logical turn of mind validate, in turn, that reasonableness in theory? I’d like to explore this subject a bit by offering some informal remarks on formal logic, the thought being that there are actually reasons for learning the latter, yet intelligent things that can be discovered pursuing the former.

Formal logic, as it is traditionally taught and interpreted, holds that a formal contradiction is the End of Days. It is the thing that causes Jason Voorhees to drop his machete, Freddy Krueger to weep like a baby, and Michael Myers to pee himself hiding under his bed. It is the gate kicked open on the Pit of Hell, the black hole that swallows the universe, the Cubs winning the Series. OK, maybe not the “black hole” thing.

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Authoritarian Thinking 2: Compartmentalization

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In previous posts I discussed various forms of invalid lines of reasoning – lines of argument that were not just casually erroneous, but formally and demonstrably wrong. In the case of the enthymeme about the existence of a right to privacy, the error is allowed to move forward because the people making the argument fail to fill in (and then attend to) all of the premises necessary to make their argument valid. Jonah Goldberg’s argument was far, far worse: Goldberg contented himself with promiscuously throwing about terms and quantifiers without any evident concern, or even grasp, of how such things actually function.crates14

It would be a gross mistake to simply dismiss the people making these errors as merely uneducated fools. The “no right to privacy” fallacy I previously detailed has been argued for by legal scholars of significant practical and scholarly background, and Jonah Goldberg is a college educated journalist with a substantial background in the industry. So how are such obvious – indeed, manifestly egregious – errors committed?

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Addendum on the Syllogism

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Recall from my earlier post that the quantifiers in formal syllogism are represented by the letters “A,” “E,” “I,” and “O.” The choice of these letters has to do with millenia of tradition, and so is not the kind of thing one will casually change to make more readily memorable. The letters stand for:

A = All

E = None (or “There is no …”)

I = Some

O = Some Not

I want to expand a bit on my earlier discussion regarding authoritarian thinking and the syllogism by using these scripts to illuminate another common piece of fallacious reasoning, one that especially lends itself to the form of the syllogism, and which is often advanced by persons who score high on Altemeyer’s authoritarian spectrum. I’ll will introduce the simplifying symbolism in parentheses as I pose the argument itself.

So here it goes: It is frequently claimed that “There is no” ( = “E”) “Mention in the Constitution” ( = “M”) of a “Right to Privacy” ( = “P”). Therefore, The “Right to Privacy” ( = “P”) is not ( = “E”) a “Right that exists” ( = “R”). I’m taking for granted the reader’s ability to follow over my formalization above. In simplified form, this argument looks like:

E M P

(← Something is missing here!)

E P R      (Notice that the quantifier “E” has been pushed to the front of the sentence. This is necessitated by the form of the syllogism, but it leads to somewhat awkward phrasing: “There is no right to privacy that is a right that exists.” This type of not-quite idiomatic phrasing is sometimes unavoidable when formalizing an argument.)

The above is not a valid syllogism, because in order to be valid it would need a second premise. Not every formal, logical argument has just and only two premises, but this is the necessary structure of a formal syllogism. However, one could fill in that missing premise, making it a valid syllogism. This kind of incomplete, but theoretically completable syllogism, is what is known as an “enthymeme.” Moreover, if one understands the formal structures of syllogisms, one can construct the missing premise, and make the whole thing a valid argument, just from the above formalized schema, without knowing anything about the interpretations the non-logical (that is, non-quantifier) symbols. Thus, without even knowing how the “M,” “P,” or “R” are intended to be interpreted, that valid syllogism is:

E M P

A R M    

E P R

The presence of an “E” quantifier in the first premise and the conclusion requires that an “A” (“All”) quantifier lead in the second, previously missing premise. The “middle term” – the “M” – must be distributed, that is diagonalized, in the second premise. And the final term that appears in the conclusion, the “R”, must appear between the quantifier and the now distributed middle term, the “M”. This gives us the “A R M” premise. Given that the “M,” “P,” and “R” do have interpretations, and knowing what we know about the quantifiers, we can read the now provided premise as, “All rights that exist are mentioned in the Constitution.”

The above is now a formally valid syllogism, which means that IF the premises are true, THEN the conclusion follows by logical necessity.

But here’s the rub: the premises are not true. In particular, the second premise, the one that was conveniently skipped over, makes a claim that is explicitly denied by the 9th Amendment! Specifically, “The enumeration in the Constitution, of certain rights, shall not be construed to deny or disparage others retained by the people.” Which is to say, no conclusion may be drawn about the existence of a right from its failure to be explicitly mentioned in the Constitution! This comes from both an understanding of the actual text of the Constitution, and a grasp of basic principles of logical reasoning. It is with such reasoning that Altemeyer’s authoritarians struggle so “inexplicably” — “inexplicably,” at least, from the purely logical point of view.

Authoritarian “Thinking” 1

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Robert Altemeyer’s The Authoritarians (abbreviated as “TA” hereafter – freely downloadable from the preceding link) is a truly important work not because of the originality of the work (the original work was all published in the peer-reviewed literature over the course of several decades), but because of the accessibility it brings to such an important constellation of ideas. I had an opportunity to revisit TA recently, in the form of an audio book as I was driving some distance. So I thought I would write a few entries touching on some of those themes from Altemeyer’s book that come especially close to my own focal areas here. This time around, I want to look at issues that fall under Altemeyer’s heading (from Chapter Three of TA) “illogical thinking.” In a later entry, I’ll talk about “compartmentalization,” which can only be separated from the other topic by some significant compartmentalization of its own. But for now I want to talk about failures of formal reasoning beyond just and only those that Altemeyer discusses (especially as one very dramatic example did not come out until after Altemeyer published his book.)

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Opinion Entitlement

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Phrases and declarations such as, “I have a right to my opinion!” or “I’m entitled to my opinion!” are deeply problematic. This is because the valorization of, and defensiveness toward, opinion – mere opinion – has become so over-inflated that it seems at times to border upon the pathological. We are expected to guard and cherish peoples’ opinions as though these were the most precious of things, when in reality opinion by itself is the most tedious, commonplace, and uninteresting stuff imaginable. Now, a bit of care needs to be exercised here, as I am using the term “opinion” in a somewhat specific sense. But the specificity of my use here is not a violation of the core meaning of the term. Meanwhile, as thinking beings – even if we only think poorly &/or occasionally – we should be aiming higher than just and only opinion.tantrum

To name just a few of the inter-related problems with opinion, as already noted above, (1) opinions are cheap throw away items of no particular interest in themselves. (2) Indeed, as thinking persons we ought to care very little about opinions, qua opinions. This “ought” is both logical and moral in its import. (3) This general disregard in no way threatens or impinges upon anyone else’s “right” to their own opinion. But rights come with responsibilities, and in this case it is the responsibility to move beyond mere opinion into the realm of reasoned argument and cogent understanding of the world. It often seems to pass that those who most ardently defend their supposedly threatened right to their opinion are more often objecting because they implicitly do not wish to take responsibility for that opinion. Let’s look at these points in turn. Continue reading

Let’s Get … Philosophical!

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(“I want to hear your bodying forth talk?” If you understood that joke you are both old and over-educated.)

So, I see another popular article suggesting that an education in philosophy is not the worst thing a person might do to themselves. I actually agree with the argument, but as presented by US NEWS in the above link, a few notes ought to be added from some one who went all the way down the rabbit hole.

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